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Live vaccination against polio has effectively prevented outbreaks in most developed coun-
tries for more than 40 years, and there remain only a few countries where outbreaks of
poliomyelitis by the wild strain still threaten the community. It is expected that worldwide
eradication will be eventually achieved through careful surveillance and a well-managed
immunization program.The present paper argues, however, that based on a simple stochas-
tic model the risk of outbreak by a vaccine-derived strain after the cessation of vaccination
is quite high, even if many years have passed since the last conﬁrmed case. As vaccinated
hosts are natural reservoirs for virulent poliovirus, the source of the risk is the vaccination
itself, employed to prevent the outbreaks.The crisis after stopping vaccination will emerge
when the following two conditions are met: the susceptible host density exceeds the
threshold for epidemics and the vaccinated host density remains large enough to ensure
the occurrence of virulentmutants in the population. Our estimates for transmission, recov-
ery, and mutation rates, show that the probability of an outbreak of vaccine-derived virulent
viruses easily exceeds 90%. Moreover, if a small fraction of hosts have a longer infectious
period, as observed in individuals with innate immunodeﬁciency, the risk of an outbreak
rises signiﬁcantly. Under such conditions, successful global eradication of polio is restricted
to a certain range of parameters even if inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) is extensively used
after the termination of live vaccination.
Keywords: vaccine-derived strain, live vaccination, risk of re-emergence, silent circulation, poliovirus, branching
process, demographic stochasticity, epidemiological dynamics
INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization (WHO) has a target to inter-
rupt wild poliovirus transmission throughout the world by 2013
(World Health Organization, 2010). The number of patients with
poliomyelitis bywild-type poliovirus infection has decreased dras-
tically due to a program using live oral polio vaccine (OPV).
Immunity by OPV is defensible against excreted viruses because
the major antigenic sites on the viral genome are relatively con-
served between serotypes during replication (Minor, 1992). How-
ever, nucleotide substitutions responsible for increased neuroviru-
lence frequently occur during replication in the human gut (Poyry
et al., 1988; Dunn et al., 1990; Abraham et al., 1993; Kew et al.,
1998; Matsuura et al., 2000; Shulman et al., 2000). It has been
reported since the 1960s that the vaccine-derived strain excreted
from humans can exhibit pathogenicity (Benyesh-Melnick et al.,
1967; Marker Test Subcommittee. The Japan Live Poliovaccine
Research Commission, 1967). This suggests the possibility that
vaccine-derived viruses could cause a poliomyelitis outbreak in
a susceptible population after the cessation of an OPV program
(Wood et al., 2000). The objective of this study was to estimate
the risk of outbreak of vaccine-derived strains after stopping OPV.
While the number of attenuated virus carriers, the source of neu-
rovirulent viruses,would decline after the discontinuation of OPV,
the number of susceptible hosts would increase and may ﬁnally
exceed the threshold for an outbreak. Therefore, successful eradi-
cation depends on which of these processes is faster.We calculated
the probability of successful global eradication, that is, the proba-
bility that the last carrier will be recovered before the population
could experience an outbreak.
It will be shown below that the mean excretion period from
an infected individual is one of the key factors that determine
whether or not eradication fails. Except for immunodeﬁcient indi-
viduals, virus is excreted from humans for ∼1–3months after
OPV administration to a susceptible host (Alexander et al., 1997).
Excreted viruses are often virulent. For example, Yoshida et al.
(2000) showed that type 3 vaccine-derived polioviruses isolated
from an environment in Japan had high neurovirulence. These
strains were isolated from river or sewage waters ∼3months
after routine OPV administration, showing that vaccine-derived
strains could circulate in the human community. Other studies
showed silent circulation of vaccine-derived strains occurred in
the human community (Zdrazilek et al., 1982; Miyamura et al.,
1992).
To avoid risks such as contact infection or vaccine-associated
paralysis (VAP), inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) has been used
in several countries (Murdin et al., 1996). The USA switched its
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immunization strategy fromOPV to IPV in 2000 (AmericanAcad-
emy of Pediatrics Committee on Infectious Diseases, 1999). As
IPV-immunized hosts can be infected by polioviruses and excrete
infectious virus, IPV is less effective thanOPV in preventing infec-
tion, though numbers of excreted viruses are greatly reduced
(Fine and Carneiro, 1999). Our study also investigated whether
switching to IPV after the cessation of OPV effectively reduced
outbreak risk.
The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reported a
poliomyelitis outbreak by a type 1 vaccine-derived strain in Haiti
and the Dominican Republic in July 2000 (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2000). In the Latin American region,
poliomyelitis caused by a wild strain was last reported in Peru
in 1991, and eradication of poliomyelitis was declared in 1994.
The recent outbreak in Haiti and the Dominican Republic could
be ascribed to the decreased rate of OPV coverage and the spread
of a neurovirulent vaccine-derived strain.
The polio eradication program plans to stop administering
OPV after disappearance of the wild strain. If vaccine-derived
strains remain when herd immunity falls below the epidemic
threshold, outbreak by these strains could occur. In this paper,
we study the probability of disease re-emergence caused by a
vaccine-derived strain using a simple mathematical model. Epi-
demiological and genetic parameters, such as transmission rate,
mean excretionperiod,mutation rate fromattenuated toneurovir-
ulent strains, are varied around estimated values (Gelfand et al.,
1959; Benyesh-Melnick et al., 1967; Dunn et al., 1990; Fine and
Carneiro, 1999), and dependence on the probability of eradication
detailed. In assessing the risk we assumed the following:
1. That the excretion period of vaccine-derived neurovirulent
viruses can be longer than that of the attenuated viruses used in
live immunization. Likewise, the transmission rates of vaccine-
derived strain can be greater than that of the attenuated strain.
When hosts recover from infection by either viral strain, the
degree of immunity is as effective as that raised by OPV
immunization.
2. That infection by either the vaccine-derived or attenuated
poliovirus can occur in IPV-immunized hosts. However, the
number of secondary transmissions from a previously IPV-
immunized host is smaller than that from a susceptible host,
and the mean excretion period is shorter in an IPV-immunized
host than in a susceptible host.
3. That when re-infection occurs in an individual immunized by
OPV, excretion from the re-infection is ignored because the
amount of virus excretion is negligibly small (Abraham et al.,
1993).
4. That antigenic drift does not occur. The focus of the study is on
the risk of outbreak by a neurovirulent vaccine-derived strain
with unchanged antigenic properties.
5. That a constant fraction (e.g., 70%) of hosts is efﬁciently
immunized (seroconverted) before OPV is stopped, and that
the population at that time is in endemic equilibrium under
constant OPV coverage.
We ﬁrst examine the risk of outbreak after OPV cessation (in
the absence of an alternate program); second,we evaluate the effect
of host heterogeneity on excretion duration; and third, we exam-
ine outbreak risk where extensive IPV immunization follows OPV
cessation.
Mathematicalmodeling is a powerful tool in the understanding
of epidemiological dynamics (Anderson and May, 1991). Pre-
vious models of polio eradication have considered neither the
re-infection by vaccine-derived strains of IPV-immunized hosts
nor mutation giving rise to neurovirulent strains (Eichner and
Hadeler, 1995; Eichner and Dietz, 1996). Our model allows for the
mutation of attenuated strains to virulent strains while replicating
in the human gut (Poyry et al., 1988; Dunn et al., 1990; Abra-
ham et al., 1993; Kew et al., 1998; Matsuura et al., 2000; Shulman
et al., 2000), and also allows both strains to infect IPV-immunized
hosts. The probability for the success of global eradication is
then calculated based on the stochastic model of epidemiological
dynamics.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
We attempted to determine the risk of virulent poliovirus out-
breaks after stopping live vaccination. Time t = 0 represents the
point at which immunization by live-poliovirus vaccine (OPV) is
stopped. With a sufﬁciently high rate of immunization, the great
majority of the population at time would be OPV-immunized
hosts, which neither the attenuated (Sabin) nor virulent strain
could infect. We ﬁrst examined the risk where no alternative pro-
gram followed OPV cessation. The effect of extensive administra-
tion of inactivated vaccine (IPV) following OPV discontinuation
will be discussed later.
DETERMINISTIC EPIDEMIOLOGICAL DYNAMICS
The number of carriers of attenuated virus would decline after
the end of a live vaccination program. Poliovirus is considered to
have been eradicated when the last carrier had recovered. How-
ever, while the number of carriers declines, the number of hosts
immunized by the live vaccine declines also. When the number of
susceptible hosts exceeds a certain threshold, the way is opened
for the spread of a virulent poliovirus. Thus, the risk of outbreak
critically depends on the speed at which carrier numbers, as the
source of virulent mutant virus, decrease, and the speed at which
susceptible hosts increase. Therefore, we need to keep track of
the changes over time of the following demographic variables:
the fraction of susceptible hosts (x), hosts infected with or car-
rying attenuated virus (y), virulent virus infected hosts (v), and
recovered and immune hosts (z),with x + y + v + z = 1. The pop-
ulation sizeK is kept constant over time.A virulent virus strain can
emerge throughmutation in attenuated virus carriers. The proba-
bility of successful eradication, or conversely, the probability of an
outbreakby a virulent virus, canbe evaluatedby constructing a sto-
chastic process for the change in the number of infected hosts. To
construct the stochastic process, we ﬁrst derive the corresponding
deterministic dynamics.
Deterministic dynamics before the cessation of OPV
Under the immunization of OPV to newborns the dynamics for x,
y, v, and z are
dx
dt
= −(βay + βvv)x − ux + u(1 − p), (1a)
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dy
dt
= βaxy − (u + γa)y − μy + up, (1b)
dv
dt
= βvxv − (u + γv )v + μy , (1c)
dz
dt
= γay + γvv − uz , (1d)
where t denotes the time variable in units of weeks, p is the immu-
nization fraction to newborns (the fraction to be immunized times
the seroconversion rate), u denotes both the natural mortality
and the birth rate of the host where we assume that host pop-
ulation is at demographic equilibrium so that the numbers of
births and deaths are balanced, βa and βv are the transmission
rates of attenuated and virulent virus, respectively, 1/γa and 1/γv
are the mean durations of attenuated and virulent virus infection,
respectively, and μ is the mutation rate from attenuated to vir-
ulent virus (Figure 1). As the numbers of births and deaths are
balanced [d(x + y + v + z)/dt = 0 follows from Eq. (1)], the total
population is kept constant (K ), and we can focus on the changes
in the fraction of each class. As z(t )= 1− x(t )− y(t )− v(t ), we
omit Eq. 1d from the analysis. If μ= 0, the condition for virulent
or wild polio virus being wiped out from the population is that
the immunization fraction p is smaller than the threshold pc:
p > pc =
(
1 − 1
Rv
)(
1 − Ra
Rv
)
, (2)
where Rv = βv/(u+ γv) and Ra = βa/(u+ γa) are the basic repro-
ductive ratios of virulent and attenuated viruses (see, for example,
Nowak and May, 2000). The threshold immunization fraction pc
necessary for the eradication of virulent viruses is lower than that
without circulation of attenuated viruses (p˜c = 1 − 1/Rv ). Thus
silent circulation of attenuated virus can signiﬁcantly increase the
efﬁciency of vaccination.With non-zeromutation rateμ> 0, both
the attenuated and the virulent virus can be maintained in the
population. The fractions of susceptible host xˆ , attenuated virus
infected hosts yˆ , virulent virus infected hosts vˆ (and recovered and
immune hosts zˆ = 1 − xˆ − yˆ − vˆ) at endemic equilibrium of
x
susceptible
y
attenuated-virus infected
z
recovered and immune
v
virulent-virus infected
βaxy
βvxv
γay
γvv
μy
u(1 − p) up
FIGURE 1 |The schematic diagram of the epidemiological dynamics. βa
and βv: the transmission rate of attenuated and virulent virus, γa and γv: the
recovery rate of attenuated and virulent virus, μ: the mutation rate from
attenuated to virulent virus, u: the host birth rate (=death rate), p: the
fraction of newborns immunized by OPV.The ﬂows by natural host mortality
are omitted.
dynamics (1) are deﬁned as
yˆ = u
(u + γa)
p{
(1 − Raxˆ) + μ˜
} , (3a)
vˆ = u
(u + γv )
p{
(1 − Raxˆ) + μ˜
} μ˜
(1 − Rv xˆ) , (3b)
where μ˜ = μ/(u + γa) and xˆ being deﬁned as a positive root of
RaRv xˆ
3 − (Ra + Rv + RaRv + μ˜Rv )xˆ2
+ [(1 + μ˜) + Ra + (1 − p + μ˜)Rv] xˆ − (1 − p)(1 + μ˜) = 0.
(3c)
Figure 2 shows how the equilibrium numbers deﬁned above
depend on the immunization fraction p and the mutation rate μ,
together with the mean number of virulent virus infections per
week, βv xˆ vˆ , under immunization.
As we will see later, the success or failure of global eradica-
tion after the cessation of OPV critically depends on the equi-
librium densities of susceptible, attenuated virus infected, and
virulent virus infected hosts at the time of stopping OPV illus-
trated above. Their parameter dependences are best described if
there was no signiﬁcant difference in transmission rates and recov-
ery rates between attenuated and virulent polio strains, such that
we can assume β= βa = βv, and γ = γa = γv. This is an impor-
tant special case that is also partly supported from the data (see
later). Substituting βa = βv = β and γa = γv = γ into Eqs 3a–3c
then yields the equilibrium factions under OPV immunization in
symmetric case:
xˆ =
[
R0 + 1 −
√
(R0 − 1)2 + 4pR0
]
/2R0, (4)
and
yˆ = u
(u + γ)
p{
(1 − R0xˆ) + μ˜
} ,
vˆ = u
(u + γ)
p{
(1 − R0xˆ) + μ˜
} μ˜
(1 − R0xˆ) , (5)
where R0 = β/(u + γ) is the basic reproductive ratio of both
strains. If R0 is sufﬁciently large (R0 >> 1), the equilibrium
fractions are approximated as
xˆ ≈ 1 − p
R0
,
yˆ ≈ u
u + γ
p
p + μ˜ , (6)
vˆ ≈ u
u + γ
μ˜
p + μ˜ ,
which describe well how the equilibrium densities change with the
immunization fraction p and mutation rate μ = (u + γ)μ˜ in the
right panels of Figure 2 (for βa = βv).
Deterministic dynamics after the cessation of OPV
The epidemiological dynamics for x, y and v after stopping
OPV are
dx/dt = −(βay + βvv)x − ux + u,
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FIGURE 2 |The densities in endemic equilibrium under the
immunization fraction p.The number, Kβv xˆ vˆ of hosts newly infected by
virulent virus in a week (top row), the equilibrium number K xˆ of susceptible
hosts (second row), that K yˆ of attenuated virus infected hosts (third row),
and that K vˆ of virulent virus infected hosts (bottom row) are plotted as a
function of immunization fraction p for varying mutation rates μ for the
emergence of virulent virus from an attenuated virus (sold: μ=0.1, dashed:
μ=0.01, dot dashed: μ=0.001). The population size K is 100 million,
βv =2.5 is the transmission rate of virulent virus. (A,C,E,G)The transmission
rate of attenuated virus is half of that of virulent virus: βa =1.25. (B,D,F,H) βa
is the same as βv. Other parameters are γa = γv =0.25, u =0.00025.
dy/dt = βaxy − (u + γa)y − μy , (7)
dv/dt = βvxv − (u + γv )v + μy ,
where t is now the number of weeks after OPV is stopped
(Figure 3). We assume that the population was in endemic
A
B
FIGURE 3 | Deterministic trajectory after stopping OPV. Deterministic
trajectory of epidemiological dynamics (8) in the text. The fraction x (t ) of
susceptibles (A) and the fraction w (t ) of infecteds (B) are plotted as
functions of the time t =0 since the cessation of OPV. The dotted line
indicates the threshold host density for outbreak: xc = (u + γ)/β. The initial
fractions x 0 and w 0 at time t =0 are assumed to be in endemic equilibrium
under OPV immunization to a constant fraction, p, of newborns. The time
t = tc at which the fraction of infecteds is minimized in deterministic
trajectory is indicated, together with time t = ts and t = te deﬁned for the
calculation of the global eradication probability (Eq. 11). Parameters are:
p =0.7, β=3.7, γ =0.18, u =0.00025.
equilibrium at time t = 0 under a constant fraction p of new-
borns immunized by OPV. As before, if we can assume that the
transmission rates and recovery rates of attenuated and virulent
polio strains are the same:β= βa = βv andγ = γa = γv, the dynam-
ics can be described by only two variables: x (the fraction of
susceptible hosts) and w = y + v (the fraction of hosts infected
by either attenuated or virulent virus),
dx/dt = −βxw − ux + u, (8a)
dw/dt = βxw − (u + γ)w . (8b)
The susceptible density increases with time, while the densi-
ties of attenuated or virulent virus infected hosts decrease with
time as long as t > tc, where tc is the time at which the suscep-
tible density hits the epidemiological threshold: x(tc)= (u+ γ)/β
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(see Figure 3). The poliovirus infected density then starts increas-
ing again. The question we ask in the following is whether the
poliovirus goes to extinction around the time t = tc where its den-
sity approaches theminimum. In the followingwederive the global
eradication probability of poliovirus by analyzing the stochastic
analog of dynamics (7) for βa < βv or γa > γv, and that of the
dynamics (8) for the special case of βa = βv and γa = γv.
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESSFUL ERADICATION
We then examine the probability of poliovirus eventually being
lost from a population without causing an outbreak. To calcu-
late extinction probabilities, we consider discrete time dynamics
corresponding to (8) with weeks as time units. We assume that
the number of secondary infections from a virulent virus infected
host per week follows the Poisson distribution with mean βKx(t ),
where K is the total population size and x(t ) is the fraction of sus-
ceptible hosts deﬁned as the solution to (8). The probability that
the progeny of a virulent virus strain found in an infected host at
time t eventually goes to extinction by chance before causing an
outbreak is deﬁned as q(t ). We also deﬁne 1− q(t ) as the mar-
ginal risk of outbreak at time t, which is the probability that an
infected host present at time t harbors the viruses whose progeny
will cause outbreaks in the future. If βa = βv = β and γa = γv γ, the
extinction probability q(t ) then satisﬁes the recursive equation
q(t ) = [(1 − δ)q(t + 1) + δ] exp [−βKx(t )(1 − q(t + 1))] , (9)
where δ= u+ γ (see Appendix for the derivation). The extinction
probability q(t ) for arbitrary time t can be determined by solving
(9), with x(t ) obtained from (5) and (8). The boundary condition
for the recursion (9) is chosen at the time at which the fraction
x of susceptibles ﬁrst approaches a local maximum xe at t = te
(such xe and te exist because susceptible hosts as unvaccinated
newborns should ﬁrst be boosted after stopping live vaccination
until x exceeds the epidemic threshold xc – see Figure 3):
qe =
[
(1 − δ)qe + δ
]
exp
[−βKxe(1 − qe)] , (10)
where qe = q(te) is the extinction probability at t = te. In deriving
(10), we used the approximation q(te)≈ q(te + 1), as the change
in x(t ) is negligibly small around its maximum xe.
The probability of eventual eradication can then be calculated
as follows.We choose a reference time point t = ts before the deter-
ministic trajectory for w reaches its minimum (see Figure 3), at
which the number of infected hostsKws =Kw(ts)was large enough
so that eradication before that time point could be ignored, but
small enough so that competition between different viral lines
could be ignored. According to extensiveMonte Carlo simulations
we found that the stochastic loss of the infecteds may occur only
after their expected number falls below 100 or less. Noting this and
the fact that the competition between viral strains can be ignored
whenKws/K<<1,we choseKws = 100. The probability of eventual
extinction is then
Pext = q(ts)Kws , (11)
i.e., poliovirus eventually goes to extinction without causing out-
breaks if and only if all progenies of the viruses present at t = ts
go to extinction. Note that if the total population is subdivided
into mutually isolated communities (e.g., 100 cities each with
one million population), then the probability that none of the
cities experiences the outbreak is given by (11) with K = 100×
one million.
We conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations of the fully
stochastic process to check the accuracy of formula (11). For the
Monte Carlo simulations, week by week changes in numbers of
susceptibles, attenuated virus infecteds, and virulent virus infect-
eds in population of size K were followed. The changes between
weeks caused by infection, recovery, mutation, and host mortal-
ity were generated by binomial pseudo-random numbers with
the rates given by the dynamics (7). As shown below, the for-
mula (11) for the probability of eventual eradication agreed quite
well with that observed in the Monte Carlo simulations for 1000
independent runs.
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PARAMETERS
The probability of global eradication depends on epidemiological,
host demographic, and genetic parameters. Thus, estimates of the
recovery rate γ, the transmission rate β, and the mutation rate μ
are critical. All parameters used in the model were scaled in units
of weeks.
Recovery rate γ, or the reciprocal of the mean excretion period.
The mean excretion duration after challenge with 6 logs of Sabin
type 1 virus has been estimated to be 20.4 days for hosts not
previously immunized, 12.3 days for previously IPV-immunized
hosts, and 4.6 days for previously OPV-immunized hosts (Fine
and Carneiro, 1999). Thus, the mean infectious period of a type
1 primary infection is about 3weeks. While type 2 poliovirus
showed a similar excretion period to type 1, type 3 has a sig-
niﬁcantly longer excretion period (Vaccine Administration Sub-
committee. The Japan Live Poliovaccine Research Commission,
1966). Mean excretion periods are estimated as 20.5, 20.6, and
38.6 days for types 1, 2, and 3, respectively, for TOPV (trivalent
oral polio vaccination; Gelfand et al., 1959). Regarding the risk of
re-emergence, type 3 poliovirus would be the most likely agent to
persist and circulate longest after stopping OPV, and hence cause
outbreaks. Therefore we adopted the excretion period for type
3 in assessing outbreak risk. Thus, we varied the recovery rate
around γa = 0.18/week, corresponding to 5.5 weeks as the mean
excretion period. We assume that the recovery rates are similar
between attenuated (γa) and virulent (γv) polio infections, and
set as γv = 0.18. Indeed, durations of excretion of attenuated type
1 polioviruses showed no signiﬁcant difference from that of wild
polioviruses (compare Figures 2 and 3 of Alexander et al., 1997).
A constant recovery rate assumed here implies that the infectious
period has the long tail in an exponential distribution. The effect
of tail in the infectious period will be examined later.
Transmission rate β, or the mean number of secondary infections.
While the probability of within-family infection was estimated to
be 0.5 per case (Benyesh-Melnick et al., 1967), we also needed
to evaluate the mean transmission rate to other members of the
community. The mean transmission rate was estimated from the
basic reproductive rate: R0 = β/(u+ γ)≈ β/γ. The basic repro-
ductive ratio of wild polioviruses in England and Wales during
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the pre-vaccination period has been estimated to be R0 = 10–
12 (Anderson and May, 1991). More recent estimates have been
R0 = 10–15 in countries with poor sanitation and hygiene, and R0
less than 10 in countries with good sanitation and hygiene (Fine
and Carneiro, 1999). If we assume γ = 0.18, this gives estimates
of β= 1.8–2.7/week in developing countries. Much higher R0’s of
more than 20 have been reported by studies of poliomyelitis out-
breaks over the past 20 years (Patriarca et al., 1997). Because of
this large variance in the estimated β, we varied the value rather
widely, from 2 to 6, to evaluate eradication probability.
Mutation rate μ from the attenuated to the virulent virus
Oral polio vaccine produced from Sabin 1 to 3 strains is a highly
attenuated vaccine. It is known that virulent mutants appear after
replication in the human gut afterOPVgiven. Such virulent strains
have caused outbreaks in populations with low OPV coverage in
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Egypt, accumulating muta-
tions through human to human transmission (Centers for Disease
Control andPrevention,2000,2001). Several nucleotidemutations
responsible for attenuation have ever been reported (Plotkin et al.,
2008). Of them, the critical and unstable attenuating mutations
in 5′-UTR (A480G in Sabin 1, G481A in Sabin 2, and C472U in
Sabin 3) appear initially during viral replication.Dunn et al. (1990)
reported that at least one viral serotype excreted from a susceptible
individual immunized byOPVhadmutated completely in 5′-UTR
within 28 days. The average contents of revertants (virulent forms)
from OPV recipients were 28–40% in type 1, 97% in type 2, and
67% in type 3 at 3 weeks after the most recent dose (Laassri et al.,
2006). Similar estimates were reported by Minor et al. (2005) and
Martinez et al. (2004). Thus, the mutation rate from attenuated to
virulent viruses appeared to be high, in the order no smaller than
μ= 0.1/week.
RESULTS
Before proceeding to speciﬁc parameter dependences, it should
be noted that the time at which the fraction of susceptible hosts
exceeds the threshold for epidemics is crucial in understanding the
problem. The number of virulent virus infected hosts increases
if the fraction of susceptible hosts is larger than the threshold
xc = (u + γ)/β, which is the reciprocal of the basic reproductive
rate R0 = β/(u + γ), and decreases when x is smaller than xc.
During the initial period, when the fraction of OPV-vaccinated
individuals is large, the fraction of susceptibles is less than the
threshold xc, so that the risk of an outbreak is negligible, even
though considerable numbers of virulent mutants are being gen-
erated at each time step. The number of virus carriers decreases
during the period from the cessation of OPV to time tc at which
the susceptible density exceeds the threshold xc. If the number of
carriers becomes zero around tc, polio will be globally eradicated.
However, if virus survives this “endangered” period around tc, the
infected density increases again and a future outbreak becomes
certain. The following formula (derived in Appendix) provides
an approximate time tc and minimum infected fraction wc as a
function of epidemiological parameters:
tc ≈ Lp/R0, (R0 >> 1), (12a)
Kwc ≈ K D
L
exp
[
− p
2
2R0
L
D
]
, (R0 >> 1, L >> D) , (12b)
where D = 1/γ is the mean duration of infection, L = 1/u the life
expectancy of the host, and R0 = β/(u+ γ) the basic reproductive
ratio. There is a highprobability of global eradication ifKwc is sufﬁ-
ciently smaller than 1;whereas, there is a high-risk of re-emergence
if Kwc is greater than 10. Although assessment of outbreak risk
should be based on the probability of global viral extinction as
discussed below, the above approximate formula gives insights
into the likelihood of re-emergence and parameter dependence
on eradication probability. It also gives an accurate estimate of
the critical time tc at which either global eradication occurs or an
outbreak starts.
PATHS TO EXTINCTION AND PATHS TO OUTBREAK
Figure 3 shows deterministic changes in fraction x of susceptibles
and fraction w = y + v of poliovirus carrying hosts after cessa-
tion of live vaccination. The fraction of susceptibles exceeded the
epidemiological threshold xc around time t = tc(=150) weeks after
live vaccination discontinuation.When the fraction of susceptibles
exceeds the epidemiological threshold, the fraction of infecteds is
at its minimum. The public health objective is to make the num-
ber of infecteds zero around time t = tc. Figure 4 illustrates sample
paths for the stochastic process corresponding to the deterministic
trajectory in Figure 3. In this example, 61 out of 100 independent
A
B
FIGURE 4 | Sample paths for the number of infecteds observed in
Monte Carlo simulations. Sample paths for the number of infecteds
observed in Monte Carlo simulations of the stochastic process
corresponding to dynamics (7). One hundred independent runs are
illustrated by thin lines. Thick broken lines indicate the deterministic
trajectory (A). The histogram shows the distribution for the times at which
viruses went to extinction (B). 38 out of 100 runs never go to extinction, and
cause outbreaks. The parameters are the same as in Figure 3, and K =108.
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runs led to the global eradication of poliovirus (i.e., the number
of infected hosts hit the absorbing boundary at zero). However, in
the remaining runs, poliovirus escaped extinction around t = tc,
increased again, leading to an outbreak by a virulent strain. The
probability of successful eradication is thus 61% by the parameter
set used in Figure 4.
PARAMETER DEPENDENCE
Figure 5 illustrates how the probability of the failure of global
eradication P fail = 1− Pext depends on each parameter, which
we discuss in turn below. We set the following values as “stan-
dards,” and varied each of the parameters to see its effect. The
fraction of immunized newborns before t = 0: p = 0.7; transmis-
sion rate of virulent virus: βv = 3.7, that of attenuated virus: either
βa = βv or βa = βv/2; recovery rate: γ = 0.18 (in both viruses);
mutation rate from attenuated to virulent viruses: μ= 0.1; nat-
ural host mortality: u = 0.00025 (all measured in units of weeks),
and total population: K = 100 million. With the chosen values
of β, u, and γ, the basic reproductive rate of polioviruses was
R0 = 20. In Figure 5, lines indicate the eradication probabil-
ity calculated from Eqs 8–11 for βa = βv, the dots indicate the
observed eradication probability for 1000 independent runs of
the stochastic process corresponding to the deterministic model
(7) for βa = βv, and the crosses indicate that for βa = βv/2. We
ﬁrst discuss the results for βa = βv in Section “The Immuniza-
tion Fraction p Before Stopping OPV, The Recovery Rate γ, The
Transmission Rate β, The Mutation Rate μ From the Attenuated
to Virulent Viruses, and The Total Population Size K ” below, and
discuss the effect of a lower transmission rate of attenuated virus
in 3.2.6.
The immunization fraction p before stopping OPV
The effect of fraction p of OPV-immunized newborns before stop-
ping the live vaccination is illustrated in Figure 5A. While the
probability of failing eradication is low when p is sufﬁciently high,
it rises drastically around p = 0.7when p is decreased. For example,
if the immunization fraction is 60% or less before OPV is stopped,
future outbreak by virulent poliovirus is almost certain. There are
two reasons why a lower p before stopping OPV enhances the risk
of future outbreaks: ﬁrst, it shortens the time for the susceptible
host density to reach the epidemiological threshold, and second,
it increases the initial infected density w0, thereby keeping the
minimum density from extinction.
The recovery rate γ
The success of global eradication greatly depends on the recovery
rate, or its reciprocal, the mean infectious period (Figure 5B). The
higher the recovery rate, themore rapidly the number of poliovirus
carriers decreases after supply by OPV is stopped. It is then pos-
sible to make the expected number of infecteds negligibly small
when the susceptible fraction exceeds the epidemiological thresh-
old. Conversely, by having a longer infectious period (a lower
recovery rate), viruses safely persist over the endangered period
around t = tc. In examples shown in Figure 5B, infectious periods
A B C
D E
FIGURE 5 |The probability of the failure of global eradication as a
function of epidemiological and genetic parameters. Each panel shows
how the probability of failing the global eradication P fail =1−P ext depends on
a chosen parameter, where lines show analytical results drawn from P ext
deﬁned in Eq. 11, and dots show Monte Carlo simulation results. Except for
the varying parameter in each panel, the parameters are ﬁxed as p =0.7,
β=3.7 (βv = βa = β for dots and lines, and βv = β, βa = β/2 for cross-hatched),
γ = γv = γa =0.18, m=0.1, K =108, and u =0.00025. Varying parameters are:
(A) fraction p of OPV immunization before its cessation, (B) recovery rate γ,
(C) transmission rate β, (D) mutation rate μ, (E) total population size K. Lines:
the probability of failure obtained from formula (11) in the text (for βv = βa = β),
dots: the proportion of failing eradications in 1000 independent runs of the
Monte Carlo simulation for βv = βa = β, and cross-hatched: that for βv = β,
βa = β/2.
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of 7weeks or longer are disastrous for eradication. In reality, the
infectious period varies between hosts, such that in hosts with
innate immunodeﬁciency the infectious period can be typically
longer than 1 year (Hara et al., 1981; Kew et al., 1998). Even a tiny
fraction of such hosts signiﬁcantly increases the risk of virulent
virus outbreaks, as we show later.
The transmission rate β
The effect of increasing the transmission rate (Figure 5C) is paral-
lel to decreasing the recovery rate described above, and both can be
regarded as having the effect of increasingR0. However, decreasing
the recovery rate affects eradication probability more sensitively
than increasing the transmission rate, as the former contributes to
slowing the decay rate for the number of virus carriers as well as
increasing R0 (see also Eq. 12).
The mutation rate μ from the attenuated to virulent viruses
The eradication probability is insensitive to themutation rate from
attenuated to virulent viruses for the case of βv = βa (Figure 5D).
If viruses persist during the period around t = tc, it does not mat-
ter which type survived as eventually the virulent virus increases
its relative frequency in the viral population (if βv = βa). Quite
different results follow when the attenuated virus has a lower
transmission rate than the virulent virus (the crosses), where the
probability of failing eradication is maximized for an intermediate
mutation rate.
The total population size K
This has an obvious dependence on the risk of outbreaks. The
larger the population size, the larger the probability that viruses
are not lost during the endangered period, and hence, the larger
the risk of outbreaks. In the example shown in Figure 5E, a popu-
lation of 10million individuals has a more than 90% of chance for
successful eradication, but communities of 100 and 1000 million
have only 50% and less than 5% chances, respectively, using the
same epidemiological parameters.
The transmission rate βa of attenuated virus smaller than that βv of
virulent virus
In each panel of Figure 5, the probability of failing global erad-
ication when the transmission rate βa of attenuated virus is half
of that of virulent virus βv is plotted as the cross-hatches. In all
cases except for the dependence of mutation rate, a lower transmis-
sion rate of attenuated viruses increases the risk of virulent virus
outbreak after the cessation of OPV. This rather counter-intuitive
results follow from the fact that silent circulation of attenuated
viruses under live vaccination helps increasing the efﬁciency of
immunization, as we have seen in the comparison between the
threshold immunization fractions with and without silent circu-
lation [see (2)], and the equilibrium densities for βa < βv (left
panels of Figure 2) and for βa = βv (right panels). Decreasing the
transmission rate of attenuated virus increases the density of sus-
ceptibles in the equilibrium population under vaccination, thus
shortening the time until the susceptible density hits the epidemi-
ological threshold after the cessation of OPV (compare Figure 2C
with Figure 2D).
TAIL OF INFECTIOUS PERIOD
A constant recovery rate assumed in the previous sections implies
that the infectious period is exponentially distributed. One may
suspect that an outbreak of vaccine-derived viruses a few years
after the cessation of OPV might be the artifact caused by this
long tail in the infectious period. We found, however, that the
long tail in the infectious period is not necessary for this to hap-
pen – it is the silent circulation of avirulent polio viruses in the
population, commonly observed in nature and occurring in our
model as well, that is responsible for the outbreak that occurs
long after the cessation of OPV. To show this, we conducted
numerical simulations in which we assume that the host recovers
exactly 4 weeks after the infection, i.e., the distribution of infec-
tiousperiodhasno tail at all. The infectedhosts nevertheless persist
in the population far longer than 4weeks (the infectious period
of an individual) after stopping OPV, which allows the outbreak
of vaccine-derived strain to occur a few years after the cessation
(Figure 6).
MARGINAL RISK OF OUTBREAK
Figure 7 illustrates change over time in themarginal risk of viruses
found at time t. Marginal risk is deﬁned as 1− q(t ) – the proba-
bility that an infected host present at time t harbors viruses whose
progeny will cause a future outbreak. Marginal risk is negligibly
small just after t = 0, and rapidly increases with t near t = tc. In
the parameters used in Figure 7, the rate of increase in prob-
ability is the highest around t = 150 when the susceptible host
density exceeds the threshold (see Figure 3). However, the mar-
ginal risk of viruses before this point is by no means negligible as
there is notable probability that progenies of viruses found during
t = 100–150 would later cause an outbreak.
EFFECT OF A HIGH-RISK GROUP
We here examine the case where a small fraction r of hosts has
a recovery rate, γ′, much lower than γ for other hosts. In the
simulation shown in Figure 8, the recovery rate of most individ-
uals was γ = 0.2. Using this value, successful eradication is certain
(other parameters: transmission rate, β= 2.5; natural mortality,
u = 0.00025; immunization fraction before stoppingOPV,p = 0.7;
total population, K = 100 million). When we assume only 0.01%
of newborns have a 10-times longer infectious period than other
members, i.e., γ′ = 0.1γ, due to innate (World Health Organiza-
tion, 1989; Fine and Carneiro, 1999), or acquired immunodeﬁ-
ciency, the probability of failure in global eradication rises to 79%
(Figure 8). Thus even a tiny fraction of high-risk group drastically
makes the global eradication difﬁcult.
EFFECTIVENESS OF IPV
What if extensive IPV immunization follows the cessation of OPV?
We assume in this case that all newborns are immunized by inac-
tive vaccine before eventual eradication. The probability of global
eradication is then evaluated in the light of the results obtained so
far by replacing the transmission rates and recovery rates with val-
ues for previously IPV-immunized hosts instead of the values for
susceptible hosts. IPV cannot prevent infection by either attenu-
ated or virulent viruses, although it can reduce disease severity, and
fewer viruses are excreted from IPV-immunized hosts than from
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A B
FIGURE 6 |The effect of tail in the infectious period. (A)The probability
that the host remains infectious after it is infected at time 0. Dotted curve:
the exponential distribution assumed in the previous sections with a
constant recovery rate γ =0.25/week. Solid curve: the truncated
distribution in which all the hosts recovers exactly 4weeks after the
infection. (B)The Monte Carlo simulation results assuming the truncated
distribution of the infectious period. The time change in the number of
virus infected hosts since OPV is stopped. Twenty-six out of 100 runs
never go to extinction, and cause outbreaks. The emergence of virulent
virus occurs after 50–60weeks after the secession of OPV.The parameters
are βa =2.5, βv =5, u =0.00025, p =0.6, μ=0.1, and K =108. The “mean”
infectious period is 4weeks.
FIGURE 7 | Marginal risk 1−q(t ) of outbreaks as a function of time t
since OPV cessation.The marginal risk 1−q(t ) is deﬁned as the
probability that an infected host present at time t harbors viruses whose
progeny will cause outbreaks in the future. p =0.7, β=3.7, γ =0.18,
u =0.00025, K =108.
unvaccinated hosts (Henry et al., 1966). IPV vaccination would
therefore reduce the transmission rate and increase the global
eradication probability (see Figure 5C). Also, IPV immunization
reduces the infectious period, again increasing the probability of
successful eradication (Figure 5B). However, these considerations
assume that all hosts are IPV-immunized after the cessation of
OPV. The actual amount of risk reduction by IPV depends on cov-
erage, vaccine efﬁciency, and host heterogeneity in the excretion
period.
DISCUSSION
The PAHO and WPRO (Regional Ofﬁce for the Western Paciﬁc)
declared the eradication of poliomyelitis in 1994 and 2000, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, an outbreak of poliomyelitis caused by a type
1 vaccine-derived strain was reported in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic in 2000 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2000), and an outbreak by a type 2 vaccine-derived strain has
been reported in Egypt (Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, 2001), in Nigeria (Wassilak et al., 2011). It is assumed that
both cases were due to the low rate of vaccine coverage. Although
OPV or IPV immunization have been effective in controlling the
transmission of wild-type strains, cases of re-emergence by wild-
type strains have been reported in several countries (Patriarca
et al., 1997) in which inadequate vaccine potency or a high rate
of unimmunized individuals led to low herd immunity in the
population.
According to a review by Patriarca et al. (1991) rates of sero-
conversion by OPV approached 100% for each serotype in indus-
trialized countries, but were∼70% for types 1 and 3 in developing
countries. Many studies have demonstrated that interference by
enteroviruses in human gut and other factors in OPV administra-
tion affect the seroconversion rate (Triki et al., 1997). Thus, even if
OPV coverage is as high as 90%, the immunized fraction p in our
model becomes 62%, under the 70% seroconversion rate observed
in developing countries. This should invoke serious concern if we
recall that the reduction in immunization fraction p before cessa-
tion of OPV drastically increases the risk of outbreak, as shown in
Figure 5A).
Our results have speciﬁcally shown that a herd immunity level
of less than 60% before the cessation of OPV led to the failure of
poliovirus eradication under typical epidemiological parameters
adopted in this paper. This suggests that maintaining more than
90%OPV coverage is not enough to ensure successful eradication,
and that every effort should be made to increase the seroconver-
sion rate in developing countries. Another important parameter
affecting the probability of eradication is the recovery rate γ esti-
mated from the mean infectious period. Most data concerning
virus excretion rates available from ﬁeld studies were for the type
1 vaccine strain (Alexander et al., 1997), while much less infor-
mation is available for types 2 and 3. As type 2 and particularly
type 3 have longer excretion periods than type 1, these strains are
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FIGURE 8 |The effect of a high-risk group on global eradication. One in
10,000 (0.01%) of hosts are assumed to be born having a longer excretion
period (lower recovery rate γ′) when infected by virus. Remaining hosts
have the recovery rate γ. γ′ =0.1γ and γ =0.2 is assumed and values
p =0.7, β=2.5, μ=0.1, u=0.00025, K =108 are used for other
parameters.Without the high-risk group, i.e., when all hosts have the
recovery rate γ =0.2, global eradication is certain. However, with the
addition of a fraction 0.01% of high-risk group in the population, eradication
fails in 79 out of 100 independent runs, allowing the outbreak of virulent
virus. (A) Sample paths for the number of infecteds for 100 independent
runs. Thick broken lines show the deterministic trajectory. (B) Deterministic
trajectories for the fraction of infected w (t ) when all hosts have the
recovery rate γ (broken line), and when 0.01% of hosts have lower recovery
rate γ′ (solid line).
more likely to persist after cessation of OPV and be the causative
agents of outbreaks. In assessing risk, we varied the recovery rate
in the range γ = 0.1− 0.25, based on estimates for the excretion
period of type 3 poliovirus, which appears to have the longest
excretion period. Whether this overestimates the risk will eventu-
ally be settled by more accurate estimations of excretion periods.
However, there may not be enough time to allow the necessary
studies, and action may need to taken now assuming the worst
possible scenario.
We have shown that even when the mean infectious period
is far below the fatal level for eradication failure (e.g., less than
7weeks in the example shown in Figure 5B), the presence of
a tiny fraction of immunodeﬁcient individuals greatly increases
the risk of disease re-emergence. This was because the primary
immunodeﬁcient group acts as a long-term viral reservoir, allow-
ing the virus to persist through the endangered period around
tc (which comes typically 150–200weeks after the cessation of
OPV). At present, no evidence exists whether secondary immun-
odeﬁcient groups, such as HIV infected patients, could act as
a long-term reservoir of poliovirus, but it is possible. Monitor-
ing virus excretion from such high-risk groups would become
critically important.
Another factor that drastically increases the risk of polio out-
break after the cessation of OPV is lower transmission rate βa of
attenuated viruses than that βv of vaccine-derived virulent viruses,
as we have shown in Figure 5 where the results for βa = βv/2 is
compared with the case βa = βv. If we further reduces the trans-
mission rate of attenuated viruses to βa = βv/4, the risk of outbreak
rises up still more (not shown). This rather unexpected and haz-
ardous dependency comes from the fact that silent circulation of
attenuated viruses under vaccination is beneﬁcial in increasing the
efﬁciency of herd immunity. The more is the transmission rate of
attenuated viruses, the less is the fraction of hosts that remain sus-
ceptible under a ﬁxed vaccination rate. Reducing the transmission
rate of attenuated viruses thus increases the susceptible density
under vaccination, and hence shortens the time until the suscep-
tible density hits the epidemiological threshold after the cessation
of OPV.
Transmission rates (β) can be estimated from R0, which in turn
have been estimated from the mean host age at infection (Ander-
son andMay, 1982; Patriarca et al., 1997; Fine andCarneiro, 1999).
Such surveys indicate that R0 of vaccine-derived poliovirus lies in
the range 5–25, depending on the hygiene levels of the region.
This is well above the threshold R0 = 1 that allows circulation
in susceptible hosts. Eradication probability can be increased by
reducing the transmission rate, i.e., by preventing vaccine-derived
viruses from circulating in the population as much as possible.
Public health attempts to reduce contact with infectious individ-
uals becomes important in reducing the transmission rate β. At
the same time, monitoring the circulation of shed virus in the
healthy human population and environment becomes even more
important after the last round of OPV.
Many studies have shown that immunity by IPV cannot pre-
vent re-infection by poliovirus (Murdin et al., 1996). However,
IPV immunization reducesmean excretion duration by 40% com-
pared to unimmunized cases, thus increasing the recovery rate γ
by 67% (Henry et al., 1966). IPV also reduces the transmission rate
because the number of excreted viruses per unit time also declines.
As a result of the increased γ and decreased β, the probability of
eradication is higher if IPV immunization follows the cessation
of OPV than if no program follows it. Although eradication can-
not be achieved without OPV, IPV should be considered, together
with its high seroconversion rate, as the primary follow-up strat-
egy after OPV cessation to prevent the secondary transmission of
vaccine-derived virus (Ghendon andRobertson, 1994; Sutter et al.,
2000).
Neither escape-mutation by antigenic drift (Nowak and
May, 1991; Nowak et al., 1991; Sasaki, 1994; Haraguchi and
Sasaki, 1997; Sasaki and Haraguchi, 2000) nor the emergence
of vaccine-resistant strains (Anderson and May, 1991; McLean,
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1995) is considered in this paper, though, in our analysis of
IPV immunization, both attenuated and virulent viruses can
be regarded as IPV-resistant strains. The presence of multiple
serotypes in the viral population complicates the eradication strat-
egy (Lipsitch, 1997). The reason we have ignored such factors in
this model of polio eradication is the observation that nucleotide
divergence within the VP1 region, which includes the antigenic
site, is less than 1.4% in vaccine strains, enabling the protec-
tion by OPV or IPV immunization (Matsuura et al., 2000). In
a study using a monoclonal antibody toward a vaccine strain,
substitutions in the VP1 region did affect neutralization (Wiegers
et al., 1989). However, these vaccine-derived strains could still be
neutralized by polyclonal antiserum (Matsuura et al., 2000), or
be prevented under well-maintained herd immunity (Iwai et al.,
2008).
Our model suggests that susceptible host density exceeds the
threshold around the time tc ≈ Lp/R0 after the cessation of OPV
(e.g., tc = 140weeks when life expectancy L = 1/u = 4000weeks,
immunization fraction p = 0.7 and basic reproductive ratio
R0 = 20). During the dangerous period around tc, additional
surveillance systems other than normal AFP (acute ﬂaccid paral-
ysis) surveillance should be organized to reduce the risk of
re-emergence:
1. Seroepidemiological surveillance of the seroconversion rate
within a population. For communities with low seroconver-
sion rates, additional immunization by IPV should be offered.
Herd immunity should be maintained at a level over 80%
seroconversion.
2. Surveillance of the environment and of shed virus from the
source of infection. Upon poliovirus isolation, immunization
by IPV is to be administrated to the risk area.
3. Public health administration.Ahygiene control program (hand
washing practice,use of disposal diapers, etc.) would contribute
to the reduction in transmission rate β, preventing the virus
from circulating.
4. Monitoring of high-risk groups such as immunodeﬁcient indi-
viduals. It is very difﬁcult to use IPV globally due to eco-
nomic reasons andother administrative difﬁculties. IPV immu-
nization in restricted regions and in at-risk communities,
together with good surveillance systems and hygiene control
programs,wouldbemorepractical tactics to globally extinguish
vaccine-derived viruses.
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APPENDIX
DERIVATION OF EQ. 9
Here we derive Eq. 9 in the text. This is derived by noting that there
may be i infected hosts in the next time step either if an infected
host gives rise to i − 1 secondary infections and itself remains
infected, or if it gives rise to i secondary infections and itself dies
or recovers. Thus
q(t ) = (1 − δ)
∞∑
i=1
λ(t )i−1
(i − 1)! e
−λ(t )q(t + 1)i
+ δ
∞∑
i=0
λ(t )i
i! e
−λ(t )q(t + 1)i
= [(1 − δ)q(t + 1) + δ] e−λ(t )(1−q(t+1))
×
∞∑
j=0
{
λ(t )q(t + 1)}j
j! e
−λ(t )q(t+1)
= [(1 − δ)q(t + 1) + δ] e−λ(t )(1−q(t+1)) (A1)
with λ(t )= βKx(t ), which then leads to (9) in the text.
APPROXIMATE TIME AND NUMBER OF INFECTEDS AT THE MINIMUM
POINT
It is useful to obtain an explicit formula for the minimum number
of infecteds and the time at which this number reaches its mini-
mum in the deterministic trajectory. This clariﬁes the parameter
dependence on the risk of re-emergence. We found the following
approximation useful.We ignore the ﬁrst term in the right hand of
(8a), because it remains very small during the time interval from
t = 0 to t = tc, to give
x(t ) = 1 − (1 − x0)e−ut , (A2)
(see, for example, Anderson and May, 1991). Integrating (8b) we
have
w(t ) = w0exp
[∫ t
0
[βx(s) − (u + γ)] ds
]
. (A3)
Clearly w(t ) attains the local minimum when t = tc where
βx(t )= u + γ. Letting
a = β − (u + γ)
u
= k(R0 − 1), b = β(1 − x0)
u
= kR0(1 − x0),
(A4)
with k = (u + γ)/u and R0 = β/(u + γ), we therefore have
tc ≈ 1
u
log
[
b
a
]
= Llog
[
R0(1 − x0)
R0 − 1
]
, (A5a)
wc ≈ w0
(
b
a
)a
ea−b = w0
(
R0(1 − x0)
R0 − 1
)k(R0−1)
exp [R0x0 − 1] ,
(A5b)
where L = 1/u is the life expectancy, and R0 = β/(u + γ) the basic
reproductive rate. We expect a high probability of eradication if
Kwc is sufﬁciently smaller than 1, and show signiﬁcant risk of re-
emergence if it is 10 or more. The deviation of wc from the true
minimum is small in logarithmic scale, though it is as large as 50%
in normal scale. However, for the purpose of quickly checking the
likelihood of successful eradication, this formula is useful. If we
assume that x0 and w0 take the values at the endemic equilib-
rium with the vaccination rate p (Eq. 5 in the text), we obtain the
asymptotic formula for large R0:
tc ≈ Lp/R0, (R0 >> 1) , (A6a)
Kwc ≈ K D
L
exp
[
− p
2
2R0
L
D
]
, (R0 >> 1, L >> D) , (A6b)
where D = 1/γ is the mean duration of infection.
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